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Recent Developments
International Union, UA W v. Johnson
Controls, Inc.: EMPLOYER MAY
NOT BAR WOMEN FROM EMPLOYMENT WHICH MIGHT EXPOSE UNBORN CHILD TO
HARM.

viduals, including one woman who
chose to undergo sterilization to avoid
losing her job.
The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
analyzed Johnson's policy using the
Rejecting a manufacturer's concerns three prong "business necessity deover ''the welfare of the next genera- fense" originally used in the Fourth
tion," the Supreme Court has held that and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Apemployers may not exclude women peal. Johnson, III S. Ct. at 1200. The
from positions which could pose hann elements of the test were as follows:
to their unborn children. International (1) the activity's health risk to the
Union, UnitedAuto., United Aero. and fetus; (2) whether the hazard was transAgric. Implement Workers ofAmerica mitted only through women; (3)
v. Johnson Controls, Inc., III S. Ct. whether a less discriminatory alterna1196,1207 (1991). Upon determining tive to prevent the health risk exists.
that exclusion of women was a facially Id. at 1201. The court found that the
discriminatory practice to which there activity ofbatterymaking did involve a
was no lawful exception, the CQurt substantial fetal health risk and that
held that such discrimination consti- fetuses were vulnerable to lead levels
tuted a violation of the Civil Rights which would not affect adults. The
Act § 703(a) (1964), as amended by 42 Petitioners presented no alternative
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988) (''Title policy to protect fetuses, and the court
VII").
granted summary judgment in favor of
Johnson Controls, Inc. ("Johnson") Johnson.
The district court further opined
manufactures batteries, a commodity
in which lead is a primary ingredient. that because Johnson had met the busiLead exposure can cause health prob- ness necessity defense test, it would
lems, including harm to unborn chil- not have to utilize a "bona fide occupadren. Johnson initially instituted a tional qualification" ("BFOQ") analypolicy of warning female employees sis. Id. A BFOQ exception would
and potential female employees of the allow an employer to "discriminate on
risks of lead, and had them sign a the basis of ' religion, sex, or national
statement indicating they were so origin in those certain instances where
warned. Johnson altered its policy in religion, sex, or national origin is a
1982, however, excluding all women bona fide occupational qualification
capable of bearing children from jobs reasonably necessary to the normal
exposing them to lead. A class action operation ofthat particular business or
challenging the policy was filed in enterprise.'" [d. at 1204 (citing Title
1984 by a number of unions and indi- VII § 703(e)(1».

The district court grant of summary
judgment was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banco The court of appeals
concluded that the district court correctly applied the business necessity
defense, which ''balancers] the interests ofthe employer, the employee and
the unborn child in a manner consistent
with Title VII." Id. at 1201 (quoting

International Union, UnitedAuto., etc.
v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d
871,886(1989»). Thecourtofappeals
further concluded that had the BFOQ
been the proper standard, it too would
have been satisfied. The court explained that "industrial safety is part of
the essence of respondent's business,
and ... the fetal-protection policy is
reasonably necessary to further that
concern." Id. at 1201.
Because the seventh circuit's holdingthat fetal protection policies qualify
as a BFOQ conflicted with Fourth and
Eleventh Circuit decisions, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue. Justice Blackmun,
speaking for the majority, initially determined that the seventh circuit was
wrong in "assum[ing] that because the
asserted reason for the sex-based exclusion (protecting women's
unconceived offspring) was ostensibly
benign, the policy was not sex-based
discrimination." Id. at 1203.
The Court first assessed evidence
indicating that lead exposure has debilitating effects upon both male and
female reproductive systems. From
this evidence, the Court determined
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that regardless of benign intent,
Johnson's policy of treating male and
female employees differently was facially discriminatory. To bolster its
conclusion, the Court cited the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
which provides that sex-based discrimination "includes discrimination 'because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions.'" Id. at 1203 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k».
Finding Johnson's policy discriminatory, the Court proceeded to determine whether the policy could be excused as a BFOQ. After examining the
statutory basis ofthe BFOQ standard,
the Court emphasized that the defense,
particularly for safety exceptions,
"reaches only special situations." Id. at
1204-05. Such special situations recognized by the Court included permitting a prison to hire only male guards in
areas of maximum security prisons
housing males, and attempting to ensure airline safety by approving age
restrictions for airline flight engineers.
To qualify as a BFOQ, however,
the ''job qualification must relate to the
'essence,' orto the 'central mission of
the employer's business.'" Id. at 1205
(citations omitted). Relating the J ohnson facts to the BFOQ standards, the
Court concluded that the standard was
not met because a genuine concern for
future generations cannot be recast as
an "essential aspect ofbatterymaking."
Id. at 1206.
The Court also engaged in legislative history analysis of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, which has its own
BFOQ criterion. The Act provides
that, unless pregnant employees differ
in their ability to perform, they must be
treated the same as any other employee.
Further, the Act's legislative history
revealed Congress's decision to reserve to women the right to work while
pregnant, or while capable of so becoming. Because the record indicated
that pregnant women are as efficient as
other employees in the manufacture of
batteries, the Court concluded that the
standard for upholding a BFOQ had
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not been met. Having failed to establish either a business necessity defense
or a BFOQ, the Court held that
Johnson's policy constituted forbidden sex discrimination. Id. at 1207.
The Court briefly addressed the issue oftort liability. Because ''Title VII
bans sex-specific fetal- protection policies," the Court felt the risk of liability
of an employer who follows OSHA
guidelines, informs women as to the
risk, and is not otherwise negligent to
be "remote at best." Id. at 1208.
Justice White, joined by Justice
Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
concurred with a portion of the
majority's rationale, as well as with the
judgment. The concurrence disagreed,
however, ''that the BFOQ defense is so
narrow that it could never justify a sexspecific fetal protection policy." Id. at
1210. White indicated that onejustification for a BFOQ would be the avoidance of substantial tort liability. As
pertaining to the facts, White felt that it
was not clear that Title VII would
preempt state tort liability. He further
stated that even if employees were
precluded from making claims for injury, their children still might be able
to do so because ''the general rule is
that parents cannot waive causes of
action on behalf of their children." Id.
at 1211.
In holding that an employer may
not discriminate against a woman on
the basis ofher pregnancy or capability
to become pregnant, the Supreme Court
has furthered the beneficient goal of
eradicating sex-based discrimnation
Bound only by moral and ethical regulation, however, expectant parents will
be forced to engage in a most difficult
balancing test, positing pecuniary interests against the interest in insuring a
healthy child.

- Howard Cohen

Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia: MARYLAND RESTRUCTURES THE
LAW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
IN NON-INTENTIONAL TORT
CASES.
In Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 601
A.2d 633 (Md. 1992), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland pronounced
sweeping changes respecting awards
ofpunitive damages in non-intentional
tort actions. In the first of three revolutionary changes to Maryland law, the
court abolished the longstanding "arising out of contract" test for punitive
damages in tort actions where the parties enjoy a contractual relationship.
Second, the court reformulated the standard for determining whether punitive
damages may be awarded by rejecting
the established "implied malice" standard and adopting the exacting "actual
malice" standard ofconduct in its place.
Third, the court announced that in all
tort cases, plaintiffs must meet the
heightened burden of proof of "clear
and convincing" evidence when seeking punitive damages.
As a result of exposure to asbestos,
plaintiffs William L. Zenobia
("Zenobia") and Louis L. Dickerson
("Dickerson") developed pleural and
parenchymal asbestosis. Zenobia alleged that he had been exposed to
asbestos while employed at various
locations over a twenty-five month
period from 1948 to 1968. Dickerson
claimed exposure to asbestos during
his employment with the Bethlehem
Steel Corporation at Sparrows Point
from 1953 until 1963.
Both plaintiffs filed claims in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City seeking damages for their asbestos related
injuries and the complaints were consolidated for purposes of trial and appeal. At trial, the plaintiffs abandoned
all theories of liability except for strict
liability under Section 402 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The defendants included six companies that
had either manufactured or supplied
and installed products containing asbestos.
The jury awarded Zenobia com-

